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Residential Property Loans and Bank 
Performance during Property Price Booms: 
Evidence from Europe* 
 
Abstract 
 
Understanding the performance of banks is of the utmost importance due to the 
impact the sector may have on economic growth and financial stability. Residential 
mortgage loans constitute a large proportion of the portfolio of many banks and are one of 
the key assets in the determination of their performance. Using a dynamic panel model, we 
analyse the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, based on a 
sample of 555 banks in the European Union (EU-15), over the period from 1995 to 2008. 
Across the entire sample we observe that an increase in residential mortgage loans 
improves bank’s performance in terms of both profitability and credit risk in. However, the 
results also show that profitability is lower during the upturn in the residential property 
cycle. In addition, and of particular interest, we observe that distinct from other markets, 
banks from Spain, Ireland and the UK see an increase in credit risk as exposure rises. 
 
Keywords: Residential Property Prices; Mortgage Loans; Bank Performance; 
Dynamic Panel Estimation 
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Residential Property Loans and Bank 
Performance during Property Price Booms: 
Evidence from Europe* 
 
1. Introduction 
The turmoil observed in the world’s financial system post 2007 clearly illustrated the close 
relationship between the property market and the financial sector. Slumps in the property 
market tend to follow and exacerbate or spur banking crises1, as demonstrated by Allen and 
Gale (2000) and as is illustrated by several historical crises2. Not only did the recent 
turbulence have its source in the U.S. subprime crisis but the resulting banking crisis’ in 
several European markets were heavily related to and intensified by lending to both 
residential and commercial real estate.  
It is today accepted that key issues surrounding the subprime crisis included the 
combined effect of strong house price appreciation and a credit boom. Pezzuto (2008) 
refers to the combined impact of low interest rates, increased levels of leverage, “credit 
euphoria” from both lenders and borrowers and a more aggressive short-term orientation, 
as the factors which strongly contributed to the subprime crisis. Acharya et al. (2011) note 
that when the “bubble” burst, a severe economic crisis was bound to result. These events 
resulted in a collapse of the banking industry3, severe negative responses in the stock 
market, a large decrease in liquidity in the credit market, economic recession and have 
contributed in a major fashion to the subsequent sovereign credit crisis. This crisis affected 
financial markets as well as real economies resulting, in drops in productivity growth, 
increases in unemployment, and a decrease in international trade. Both Horta et al. (2010) 
and Hwang et al. (2010) examined the contagion effects of the U.S. subprime crisis on 
international stock markets, with the later paper reporting evidence of contagion in both 
emerging and developed European markets. Verick and Islam (2010) find that the Baltic 
States, Ireland and Spain were the European countries that suffered the most severe labour 
                                                 
1 Herring and Wachter (1999) state that “Real Estate Cycles may occur without banking crises and banking crises may 
occur without real estate cycles. But the two phenomena are correlated in remarkable number of instances ranging over a wide 
variety of institutional arrangements, in both advanced industrial nations and emerging economies”. 
2 For example, in the US and Scandinavia (late 80’s), in Mexico and Japan (early 90’s) and in Southeast Asia 
(1997/1998). Please refer to Hilbers et al. (2001). 
3 The list of banks that have been affected by the 2007-2012 global financial crisis can be seen in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_bankrupt_or_acquired_banks_during_the_subprime_mortgage_crisis 
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market impact and economic contraction as a result of the subprime crisis. In contrast, 
Germany and Austria were the least affected.  
Of all the different assets that comprise banks’ portfolios, real estate related ones 
are particularly important for two particular reasons. Firstly, residential mortgage loans 
represent one of its largest asset categories. Within the EU-15, for the period 2001 to 2008, 
the weight of residential property loans in total loans never fell below 21% (2008), reaching 
a maximum of 33% in 2003 (ECB, 2005 and 2010). Secondly, banks’ exposure to the real 
estate sector is enhanced due to both lending to the commercial sector and property 
development and construction and also the use of property as collateral for other loans. 
Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that during an upswing of real estate prices, banks have 
a tendency to underestimate the default risk of loans directly or indirectly related to real 
estate. The existence of moral hazard and disaster myopia, caused by high competition and 
an emphasis on size growth, following the liberalisation of the banking sector and by the 
loss of institutional memory regarding the possibility of property prices reversals, leads to 
banks taking excessive risks whereas the charged risk premium may be insufficient to cover 
potential losses4. Jimenez et al. (2006) state that during booms, riskier borrowers obtain 
credit more easily and collateral requirements decreases. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) also found 
evidence of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the 
number of loan applications. The authors show that lending standards declined to a greater 
extent in areas that experienced faster credit growth. They also note that the entry of new 
lenders contributed to the decline in lending standards. With specific reference to the 
subprime experience in the U.S. Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) report that loan quality 
consistently declined for the six years prior to the crisis in 2007. They argue that the high 
level of house price appreciation observed in the US during this period contributed to the 
decline in loan quality5.  
Gentle et al. (1994) examine the extent of negative equity6 in the United Kingdom in 
the early 90s, noting that the “property owning democracy” turned into a “nation of 
debtors”, after the collapse of property prices. The phenomenon of negative equity has also 
                                                 
4 The Economist, 2003, reveals that the “six countries where houses appear to be overvalued (America, Britain, 
Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) also share another bubble-like symptom: an explosion in mortgage borrowing in 
recent years. ... In the Netherlands the average new mortgage there is 110% of the value of a home, because lenders are happy to 
finance all the purchasing costs, including stamp duty and fees. ... This means that if prices were to drop, more households would 
be left with debts exceeding the value of their home than were a decade ago.” 
5 For specific work on default and foreclosures in the U.S. subprime market in recent years see papers such as 
Gerardi et al. (2007) and Daglish (2009).  
6 Negative equity refers to the situation whereby the market value of the property on the mortgage completion 
date is lower than the value of the capital owing to the bank. 
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been observed by White (2010a, 2010b), who states that the collapse of property prices in 
the U.S. resulted in an increasing number of defaults, since the property market prices fell 
below the original mortgage advance used to buy the property7. Koetter and Poghosian 
(2010) using a unique dataset for Germany illustrate the importance of not only considering 
pure price changes when examining the risk of default. It is imperative that factors such as 
the degree of deviation away from fundamental values are also factored in.  
The interactions between financial institutions and real estate markets have received 
quite significant attention in the literature over recent few decades. Tripp and Smith (1993), 
Ambrose et al. (2003), and Igan and Pinheiro (2010) discuss the relationship between real 
estate lenders, interest rates, and the availability of real estate loans. Allen et al. (1995), He et 
al. (1997) and Elyasiani et al. (2010) examine the effects of real estate market conditions on 
bank stocks, and find that bank stock prices are very sensitive to changes in real estate 
prices. Davis and Zhu (2009) examine the relationship between commercial property price 
movements and the performance of individual banks in a range of industrialized 
economies. Finally, Gibilaro and Mattarocci (2013) use a representative sample of 
European banks to study the relationship between the property market trends and bank 
performance/risk exposure for the period between 2007 and 2011. Despite this extensive 
literature on the relationship between bank loans and real estate prices at a macroeconomic 
level, only a few studies have been undertaken with a specific focus on the impact of real 
estate prices on bank profitability and credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) argue that most 
studies have failed to adequately highlight the role that real estate may play in the 
performance of banks. Furthermore results may be biased given that most studies 
separately examine the factors that determine either bank profitability or risk. 
We use dynamic panel data methods to estimate the influence of residential 
mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, using a sample of 555 banks in the EU-15, 
over the period from 1995 to 20088. We specifically focus in on the last boom in order to 
more closely appreciate the behavior of banks during this period. Our results suggest 
that a higher exposure to residential mortgage loans on the balance sheet seems to 
improve bank’s performance in both profitability and credit risk in pre-crisis times. 
The results obtained further show a reduction in both credit risk and profitability 
                                                 
7 The impact of default in the U.S. was particularly evident in loans originated post 2005 in part due to 
borrowers being more vulnerable to a market reversal and the corresponding decline into negative equity. In 
addition, as White (2010a, 2010b) there was also the issue of strategic default. 
8 In contrast, Gibilaro and Mattarocci (2013) analyze the period 2007 and 2011. They are therefore restricted 
in their ability to explain the patterns in lending observed during boom markets.  
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for banks during the upturn in the price cycle pertaining to the residential property 
sector. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly characterise 
the European residential mortgage markets and provide a brief review of the factors 
determining bank profitability and credit risk, with a special emphasis on those pertaining 
to the real estate market. In section 3 we summarize the research questions and present the 
specification of the empirical models proposed. Section 4 sets out the results of the 
empirical analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
 
 
2. Determinants of Bank Profitability and Credit Risk  
2.1. Residential Mortgage Loans in the European Market 
We focus on the residential mortgage lending behavior of banks for three main reasons. 
Firstly, excessive risk taking in real estate lending is considered to be one of the primary 
factors which contributed to the recent financial crisis (Acharya et al. 2011). Therefore, an 
empirical examination of how linkages between dynamics in the housing market and 
residential mortgage loans potentially bank profitability and risk is of significant interest. 
Secondly, residential mortgage loans are by far the largest category in the loan portfolio of 
most banks. Table 1 shows the importance of residential mortgage loans in terms of GDP, 
value per capita and its weight in the balance sheet of European banks. The table also 
reveals the existence of differing trends regarding the importance of residential mortgage 
loans across the European market. While residential mortgage loans in terms of GDP 
declined in Germany from 55.6% in 1999 to 43.2% in 2008, there was a substantial increase 
in other countries. Specifically, Spain and Ireland saw an almost tripling in the value of 
residential loans during this period. Of interest is the strong housing markets seen in those 
markets during the same time period. In addition there is substantial evidence that there are 
significant differences between the EU countries with regard to the characteristics of the 
mortgage market9. These institutional differences may aid in explaining the differences 
observed in the volatility of prices, weight of residential mortgage loans and influence any 
differences observed in bank’s risk-taking across European countries (see table 1). 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
                                                 
9
 e.g. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Acharya et al. (2011). 
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2.2. Bank Risk and Profitability and Real Estate Prices 
Several studies have pointed out that there is a strong financial and economic relationship 
between real estate and credit cycles, whereby decreased economic activity leads to a 
feedback cycle of falling asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets, tightening financing 
conditions and constrained external financing to fund profitable investment opportunities, 
and so forth.  The most influential argument refers to the “financial accelerator” mechanism 
proposed by Bernanke et al. (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Increasing property 
prices boost bank capital by increasing the value of real estate owned by the bank and the 
value of any collateral pledged by borrowers. In particular, property price appreciation 
discourages riskier mortgage borrowers from defaulting (Daglish, 2009). Therefore, 
increasing property prices should reduce the riskiness of banks’ assets and decrease the 
likelihood of financial distress in the banking sector (Niinimaki, 2009). This collateral value 
hypothesis predicts a negative relation between property prices changes and banks’ risk. 
 However, alternatively, an increase in property prices could fuel the accumulation 
of risks by banks due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). Rising property prices and lower (perceived) risk of real estate financing 
may induce excessive lending to risky real estate borrowers at unreasonably low rates (e.g. 
Jimenez et al. 2006 and Dell’Ariccia et al. 2012). Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that 
banks may underestimate the default risk on mortgages loans during strong property 
market conditions. Specifically, banks can display a tendency to disregard the danger of 
adverse selection when they expand lending within a short space of time. This tendency 
towards “disaster myopia” can arise as a result of poor risk management or a changing 
tolerance for risk10.  
Consequently, the quality of the loans portfolios is likely to deteriorate and the 
loans portfolio become much riskier during the maturity phase of the cycle11. A further 
element in this regard is that participants in residential property markets frequently display 
extrapolative or adaptive expectations (Case and Shiller, 1989, Poterba, 1991). This can 
contribute to the presence of myopic expectations in that participants may fail to account 
for potential reversals in price trends (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005, Stevenson, 2008). 
                                                 
10 
“Disaster myopia” can in part be attributable inter alia to inadequate data, measurement bias (Borio et al., 
2001), pervasive incentives linked to the safety net, intensified competition following the liberalisation of the 
banking sector (e.g., Chan et al. 1986, Hellman et al. 2000 and Marquez 2002) or institutional memory loss 
over time regarding the possibility of property prices collapsing (Berger and Udell, 2004). 
11Hellman et al. (2000) express the view that Japanese financial-market liberalization in 1990 increased 
competition and reduced the profitability and franchise value of domestic banks. This, together with others 
factors, contributed to the East Asian financial crisis and a weaker financial system in Japan. 
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Therefore, increasing property prices may encourage riskier investors to speculative on 
further price increases and demand credit from banks. Both factors lead to larger exposures 
and the accumulation of risky assets, which are prone to mis-pricing. Koetter and 
Poghosyan (2010) corroborate the importance of deviations from the fundamental value of 
real estate, rather than just price levels or changes alone, when assessing bank stability. 
Once a shock occurs, disaster myopia may lead to disaster magnification, a phenomenon 
that can be exacerbated by banks delaying the provisioning of loan losses to the recession 
phase of the property cycle. This results in the economic cycle having a greater impact on 
bank capital and profitability (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). The net result of this is that the 
disaster myopia phenomenon might lead to banks taking excessive risks, while the risk 
premium required may not be sufficient to compensate for potential losses.  
Another related issue is concerned with the diversification versus focus debate (e.g. 
Diamond 1984, Winton 1999, Stomper 2006). Traditional banking theory argues that banks 
should diversify their credit portfolio, given that through the expansion of their credit lines 
to new sectors, the bank’s probability of default will be reduced (e.g. Diamond 1984). The 
idea is that due to asymmetric information, diversification reduces financial intermediation 
costs. Moreover, less diversified banks would be more vulnerable to economic downturns, 
since they expose themselves to few sectors. On the other hand, corporate finance theory 
supports the idea that firms should concentrate their activities on a specific sector or group 
of sectors in order to exploit the benefits of enhanced expertise in these sectors (e.g. 
Stomper 2006 and Acharya et al. 2006). Another argument against portfolio diversification 
is that it can result in increased competition with other banks, making this strategy less 
attractive. In particular, Winton (1999) argues that diversification only reduces the risk of 
bank failure in the case of moderated risks of default. When the risks are low, banks may 
benefit more from specialization than from diversification, since there is a low probability 
of failure. Conversely, when the probabilities of insolvency are high, diversification may 
even worsen the situation, since the bank will expose itself to many sectors, and the 
downturn of one may be enough to lead this bank to bankruptcy. The overall conclusion is 
that the relationship between focus and return is U-shaped in risk. Finally, Wagner (2010 
and 2011) shows that if diversification at financial institutions benefits the financial stability 
of financial system, it also entails a cost – i.e. makes systemic crises more likely. When 
systemic crises induce additional costs full diversification is no longer desirable as a result 
and the optimal degree of diversification may be arbitrarily low.  
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3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1. Research Questions 
The paper considers three core research questions.  
I. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk? 
Does the impact vary over the property price cycle and is it influenced by the institutional characteristics of 
the country where the bank operates? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk can 
be written as: 
𝑑(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡)
𝑑(𝑅𝑀𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡)
= 𝛼11 + 𝛼12 ∗ 𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡−1                                                 (1) 
where RISK is the proxy for credit risk; RMShare is the weight of residential mortgage loans 
in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the growth rate in real residential property prices. 
The results will help to shed light on whether residential mortgage loans have a positive or 
negative impact on bank credit risk and whether the effect on credit risk increases or 
decreases with the rise in residential property market prices (given by parameter 12). As 
previously noted there are significant differences across EU-15 countries in terms of the 
characteristics of the mortgage credit markets. It is hypothesised that banks in countries 
whose credit policy characteristics are less conservative have a greater propensity to take 
risks. 
 
II. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on bank 
profitability? Does the impact vary over the residential property price cycle? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank profitability 
can be written as: 
𝑑(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑡)
𝑑(𝑅𝑀𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡)
= 𝛼12 + 𝛼13 ∗ 𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡−1                                                 (2) 
where PROFIT is the proxy for bank profitability; RMShare is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the real residential property 
growth rate or the accumulated growth rate of real housing prices. The results will allow an 
evaluation of whether residential mortgage loans have a positive or negative impact on 
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bank profitability and if the effect on bank profitability increases or decreases with the rise 
in residential property prices (given by parameter 13). 
Chan et al. (1986) show that increased competition erodes the surplus that banks 
can earn by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduction in value leads banks to 
reduce their screening of potential borrowers and, thus overall credit quality in the 
portfolio declines. In a context of asymmetric information, Marquez (2002) notes that an 
increase in the number of banks in a market leads to a dispersion of borrower-specific 
information and will result in not only higher funding costs for low-quality borrowers but 
also in easier access to credit for low-quality borrowers. The customers to whom banks 
lend later in the cycle may not only be of lower credit quality but also borrow more in 
terms of LTV. This leads to a combined impact. Firstly, they are purchasing properties at 
higher prices due to buying later in the cycle. This together with higher borrowing, in terms 
of LTV, leads to such borrowers being more vulnerable to negative equity. Thus it is likely 
that the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability will vary over the 
residential property price cycle. 
 
III. Is the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage loans a non-linear function? Is 
the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage loans a function of the level of risk?  
The marginal effect of the increase residential mortgage loans (RMShare) on bank 
profitability can be described as: 
𝑑(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑡)
𝑑(𝑅𝑀𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡)
= 𝛼12 + 𝛼13 ∗ 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡 +∝14∗ 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑡
2                                         (3) 
where PROFIT is the proxy for bank profitability; RMSHARE is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RISK is the proxy for bank credit risk. If the 
marginal effect of the concentration on residential mortgage loans on bank profitability is a 
U-shaped function of the level of risk, then 13 < 0 and 14 > 0. Thus, the focus on 
residential property loans would achieve better bank performance in both low and high risk 
scenarios. 
 
3.2. Variables and Model Specifications 
 
3.2.1. Bank Credit Risk Model 
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In order to study the effects of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk, we 
estimate following model: 
𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊𝒕 =∝1 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ ∝2
1
ℎ=0
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−ℎ +∝3 𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑀𝑡 +∝4 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡
+ ∑ ∝5 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑖𝑡−ℎ
3
ℎ=1
+∝6 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 +∝7 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ ∝8 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−ℎ
3
ℎ=2
+ ∑ ∝9 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−ℎ +
3
ℎ=2
 ∝10 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−3
+∝𝟏𝟏 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 + ∝12 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝑷𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒕−𝟏  + 𝑇𝑖 
                               + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (4) 
 
where RISK is the proxy for bank i credit risk as measured by the ratio between loan loss 
provisions to net loans (PROV) or by the ratio of non-performing loans and the total of 
loans (NPL) in period t12; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans on total 
assets of the bank; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing 
prices (in the country or region, for those banks whose exposure to the real estate market is 
at a regional level). Table 2 presents the residential housing price series used in this study.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
We use the following control variables. GDP is real GDP growth; DFAM is the 
ratio between the liabilities of families and GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities 
of companies and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio between the bank’s total credit 
and total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZEi is the ratio 
between the bank’s assets and banking industry aggregate assets; NIM is the proxy for bank 
profitability measured by Net Interest Margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between 
equity capital and total assets; PREM is the difference between interest income over total 
assets and the interbank interest rate; Ti and ηi captures any unobserved bank-invariant time 
effects and unobservable effects of the intrinsic characteristics of bank i (such as managers’ 
risk-aversion and preferences), respectively. εit is the error term. The detailed definition of 
the variables and the expected relationships are shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
12 Angbazo (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002), amongst others, use NPL as proxy of bank credit risk; Lepetit et 
al. (2008a, 2008b), use PROV as proxy of bank credit risk and Acharya et al. (2006) and Davis and Zhu (2009) 
use both proxies as a measurement of bank credit risk.  
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Insert Table 3 
 
3.2.2. Profitability Model  
We estimate the following linear regression:  
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝒊𝒕 =∝1 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ ∝2
1
ℎ=0
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−ℎ +∝3 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝4
3
ℎ=2
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−ℎ
+  ∝5 ∑ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−ℎ
2
ℎ=1
+∝6 ∑ 𝑆𝐷𝑅3𝑀𝑖𝑡−ℎ
2
ℎ=1
+∝7 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 +∝8 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
+  ∝9 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝10 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−ℎ +
3
ℎ=2
 ∝11 𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡   
+  ∝12 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 + ∝𝟏𝟑 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝑷𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝒕−𝟏 + 𝑇𝑖 
                              +𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (5) 
 
We use the Net Interest Margin (NIM) and return on assets (ROA) as proxies for 
bank profitability (PROFIT)13. RMSHARE and RPPRICE are defined as above. The 
following control variables are used. BBMB is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
bank operates in a bank-based system and the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based 
system. RISK is defined as above and lagged two and three periods. LIQ is the ratio of 
Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding. SDR3M is a proxy for interest rate risk and is given 
by lagged annual standard deviation of daily interbank 3 month interest rates. HHI is the 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index. ΔLOANi is the rate of growth of credit loans. IPP are 
Implicit Interest Payments given by the ratio of [Non-Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues] 
to Total Assets. The other variables are defined as above. The detailed definition of these 
variables and the expected relationships are shown in Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
                                                 
13  Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara (2004), and Lepetit et al. (2008b) 
amongst others, use NIM as a proxy for bank profitability; Acharya et al. (2006) use ROA as a proxy for bank 
profitability and Davis and Zhu (2009) use both proxies as a measurement of bank profitability. 
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In order to assess if the relationship between bank profitability and residential 
mortgage loans credit is a U-shaped function of the level of risk we estimate the following 
model: 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻𝒊𝒕 =∝1 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ ∝2
1
ℎ=0
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−ℎ +∝3 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝4
3
ℎ=2
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−ℎ
+∝5 ∑ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−ℎ
2
ℎ=1
+∝6 ∑ 𝑆𝐷𝑅3𝑀𝑖𝑡−ℎ
2
ℎ=1
+∝7 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 +∝8 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
+∝9 ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝10 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡−ℎ +
3
ℎ=2
 ∝11 𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 +∝12 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕
+ ∝13 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +∝14 𝑹𝑴𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒕 ∗ 𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝟐 + 𝑇𝑖
+ 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                           (6) 
 
We also consider the impact of mortgage credit market characteristics on bank 
credit risk and profitability. For this purpose, the variable LTV (the average loan to value 
ratio in the country where the bank operates) is added to Equations (4) to (6).  
 
3.3. Dynamic Panel Data Models  
Salas and Saurina (2002) and Valverde and Fernández (2007) suggest using first-differences 
of the equations above in the estimation of dynamic panel models, in order to eliminate 
bank-specific effects (see Arellano and Bond, 1988 and 1991). The unobservable individual 
effects (ηi) in Equations (4) to (6) tend to be correlated with other explanatory variables. 
For example, in the credit risk model, ηi tends to be correlated with the managers’ 
(unobservable) risk preferences and with the lagged loan provision ratio. If Equations (4), 
(5) and (6) are expressed in first differences the individual effects will be eliminated. 
However, by using static panel data estimation, estimates would be biased given that the 
transformed lagged dependent variables will still be correlated with the transformed error 
terms. Furthermore, the explanatory variable weight, RMShare, is endogenous, and should 
therefore be defined with adequate instrumental variables. In particular, three variables are 
treated as endogenous in the estimation. These are the proxies for credit risk (RISK), 
profitability (PROFIT) and the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets 
(RMShare).  
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To overcome the aforementioned biases, we use linear GMM estimation. The 
instrumental variables for the endogenous variables are the same variables lagged 
throughout a number of periods, (h), sufficient to prevent the second-order autocorrelation 
of residuals (Salas and Saurina, 2002)14. In Equation (4) the dependent variable is 
transformed, since the ratio of loans provisions to loans is a truncated variable (between 
zero and one), and is therefore not suitable for the GMM procedure. 
Jimenez et al. (2012) show that changes in EU monetary policy affect bank lending 
and bank risk-taking in all EU countries. They analyze the effects of monetary conditions 
and economic activity on the granting of loans with individual loan applications records 
depending on the strength of bank balance sheets measured by bank capital and liquidity 
ratios. To capture omitted variables, that vary across time (and affect all banks in EU), they 
control for time-varying observed and unobserved firms heterogeneity with firm-month 
fixed effects (i.e. there is a dummy for every-year or month combination). As in Jimenez et 
al. (2012) to analyze and quantify the effects of residential property loans on bank 
performance, we include observable bank characteristics and bank fixed and time fixed 
effects in the specifications, thereby inevitably weakening performance identification.  
 
3.4. Sample 
The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of annual data, obtained from the 
financial reports and accounts of 555 banks within the EU-15 countries for the period 
from 1995 to 2008. The use of lagged variables reduces the time period of the estimations. 
The bank credit risk and profitability models are estimated from 1999 and 2002 
respectively. The following table presents the distribution of the sample banks by country 
and by specialisation.  
 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
                                                 
14
 The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the validity of the assumption of absence of 
serial correlation of the error term and on the validity of the instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest 
two tests to validate these assumptions. The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. This 
statistic will be asymptotically chi-squared under the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with 
the instruments. The second test, examines the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms. Under 
the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, this test has a standard-normal distribution. 
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The data was obtained from BANKSCOPE. Banks with less than three consecutive 
years of observations, or missing information in terms of explanatory variables, were 
excluded. With regard to banks where there is no information available in BANKSCOPE 
concerning the amount of residential mortgage lending the information was collected from 
their annual reports and accounts15. The data relating to the concentration index, interbank 
market interest rates; residential housing prices; families’ and companies’ indebtedness 
ratios and GDP were obtained from the European Central Bank, Thompson Reuters 
Datastream, BIS House Prices and EUROSTAT, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 present the 
descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the estimation of the credit risk and 
profitability models. 
 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 
 
It can be seen that Spain, United Kingdom, and Ireland are the countries with the 
highest weights of residential mortgage loans in terms of total bank assets. This is not 
particularly surprising given the high house price appreciation observed prior to 2007 in 
these countries. Additionally, banks in these countries operated under less conservative 
credit policies (Martins et al. 2015). Further, these markets have some of the highest owner-
occupancy rates in the EU-15. In contrast, markets such as Germany and Austria not only 
have more conservative lending practices (Martins et al. 2015) but also experienced far 
lower rates of house price appreciation and the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
terms of total assets is substantially lower.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Credit Risk Model 
Table 8 shows the results for the estimates of the credit risk model regression (4) – 
non-performing loans (NPL) and loan losses provisions (PROV) are respectively displayed 
in panels A and B. The results suggest that banks that increase their exposure to residential 
mortgage loans decrease credit risk. These findings are consistent with Pensala and Solttila 
                                                 
15 IAS14 (substituted by IFRS 8 on 1st January 2008) “Operating Segments” require companies to disclose the 
main operating segments. Given the importance of residential mortgage loans in the activity of the banks 
analysed, it is possible – by looking at the annual report and accounts – to calculate the amount of residential 
mortgage loans.  
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(1993), Randall (1993), Murto (1994), Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The results also show 
that during the upturn in residential market prices cycle, a rise in residential mortgage 
lending leads to a decrease in bank credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) have also shown that 
commercial property prices are negatively associated with bad loans ratios. Despite the 
possibility of “disaster myopia”, whereby the quality of bank assets may deteriorate without 
the banks being aware that they are accepting a higher risk level, Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003) state that there tends to be a policy of delaying the recognition of loan loss 
provisions until after property prices have reserved. This being the case, the relationship 
between residential mortgage loans and credit risk tends to be only recognized in bank 
balance sheets a posteriori, namely during a collapse in residential property prices. Therefore, 
these results must be taken with caution and in this context. 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
Most of the control variables coefficients show the expected sign, although some 
are not statistically significant. The GDP growth rate (current and lagged one-year) has a 
negative effect on credit risk, as predicted by theory. For the other two macroeconomic 
variables, families and companies’ indebtedness, the coefficient is, respectively positive and 
significant, as expected, and negative or not statistically significant in majority 
specifications. The weight of credit in bank assets and banks’ relative size also affects the 
level of loan provision or non-performing loans, as expected. The results illustrate that 
larger banks seem to account for a lower relative weight of loan provisions or non-
performing loans in their balance sheets. 
The variables associated with the inefficiency level and solvency ratio are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels for the majority of estimations. This may be 
the result of multicolinearity issues. With regard to the solvency ratio, Davis and Zhu 
(2009) argue that its effect on credit risk is unclear. The authors state that when the 
solvency ratio is high, the incentives for taking risks are lower. Therefore, a negative sign is 
to be expected. However, capital ratios that are too-low may lead to banks to “gamble for 
resurrection”. This may therefore, have the opposite impact on banks’ lending decisions. 
Banks’ interest margins are statistically significant. As for the proxy for the risk premium, it 
is not statistically significant in the specifications for all the banks. Salas and Saurina (2002) 
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argue that the lack of a positive impact may occur if strong competition introduces cross-
subsidization of products inside banks.  
The aim of the specifications IV and V is to analyse the impact of institutional 
factors on bank credit risk. We use the “Loan-to-Value” (LTV) ratio, obtained from the 
ECB, which corresponds to the average loan-to-value ratio in the country where the bank 
operates. The LTV ratios are used due to the absence of information set out individually by 
banks regarding these ratios. Specifications IV and V show that countries with higher LTV 
ratios observe higher level of loan losses provisions.  
Due to the accentuated process of bank internationalisation and integration at a 
regional and international level, real estate assets may be related with regional or 
international residential prices. Specification VI therefore assess the effects of altering the 
proxy associated with residential property prices in the case of banks whose exposure to 
real estate is at a regional or international scale. The results reveal that an increase in the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets leads to a greater decrease in credit 
risk16. 
In order to more clearly see if differences in the results are noticeable depending of 
the countries involved we re-estimate the models based on various sub-samples. These 
findings are reported in Table 9. As with Table 8 Panel A uses Non-Performing Loans as 
the proxy for risk whilst Panel B uses Loan Loss Provisions. Specifications I and II refer, 
to the groupings of firstly Germany and Austria and secondly Spain, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. These are based on the cluster analysis results from Martin et al. (2015). The first 
grouping (Germany and Austria) is, as noted previously, characterised by a more 
conservative mortgage market and reduced owner-occupation. In contrast the countries in 
the second cluster have a more liberal mortgage market and increased owner-occupational. 
The results suggest that the impact of increasing residential mortgage loans on total assets 
leads to a reduction in credit risk in the cluster formed by Germany and Austria. Moreover, 
Specification II shows that in the case of Spain, Ireland and United Kingdom, the impact 
of increasing residential mortgage loans on total assets leads to an increase in credit risk. 
These findings are extremely interesting. The overall results do highlight that due to factors 
such as the perceived security provided by real estate loans they can contribute to reduced 
risk. However, the fact that these findings are contradicted in those markets that observed 
                                                 
16 In order to assess the robustness of the results we re-estimated the models under a variety of alternative 
specifications, without investment banks and for a curtailed sample period ending pre-crisis in 2006. The 
results, which are available from the authors upon request, are consistent with those reported in Table 8. 
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both high levels of house appreciation and subsequently problems in the banking sector, 
does raise issues about how banks assess risk with respect to residential loans. Do banks 
display myopic behaviour and therefore fail to fully and adequately account for the risk of 
both market corrections in housing and an increase in default and foreclosure rates?  
Specifications III and IV analyze the effects of increasing residential mortgage loans 
on bank credit risk in the 1st and 4th quartiles of banks, divided on the basis of the weight of 
residential mortgage loans on total credit. The results reveal that an increase in residential 
mortgage loans results in a decrease in credit risk, in the case of 1st quartile (with less 
residential mortgage loans) and a positive but insignificant effect, in the case of 4th quartile.  
In order to assess the robustness of the results we re-estimated the models under a 
variety of alternative specifications. Firstly, to avoid some of the multicolinearity issues, we 
remove from the model all of the lagged variables where the coefficient was not statistically 
significant. Our conclusions remain unchanged. Second, all the results (signs and 
significance of parameters) hold if the risk premium does not appear in the model or if 
another proxy is used. Finally, we find that the basic results do not change when we apply 
static panel data procedures or when we estimate the model without time fixed effects. All 
of these results are available upon request from the authors. Finally, the hypotheses of the 
absence of a time series second order correlation (the regressions were estimated in the first 
difference) and of the validity of the instruments used (Sargan test) are not rejected.  
 
 
4.2. Profitability Model 
Table 10 presents the results of the linear regressions between bank profitability and the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets, as specified in equation (5). The results 
obtained for the five specifications in Panel A and B, which respectively use Net Interest 
Margin and Return on Assets as the proxy for profitability, do not show the existence of a 
statistically significant relationship between the weight of residential mortgage loans in total 
assets and banks’ profitability. By looking at specification II and III, it can be seen that 
bank profitability tends to decrease during an upturn in the residential property cycle. This 
can be at least partly explained by the “disaster myopia” phenomenon. As discussed above, 
in periods of house prices rises, banks tend to expand credit to riskier customers and 
collateral requirements tend to decrease. These conclusions are also corroborated by 
specifications IV and V, where the residential property prices variable is replaced by the 
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cumulative real growth of residential property prices in the country (or region, in the case 
of specification V) where a bank operates.  
 As with credit risk models we also run robustness tests excluding investment banks 
and limiting the sample period to 2006. The finding that profitability decreases during an 
upturn in the residential property cycle is also corroborated. However, the curtailed results 
do reveal that those banks increasing their weight of residential mortgage loans in total 
assets saw their profitability rise during the period analyzed (2002 to 2006). The coefficient 
associated with the variable RMSHARE is positive and statistically significant. The relevant 
detailed results from the authors but they do highlight the importance of properly taking 
into account the nature of the firms.  
 
Insert Tables 10 and 11 
 
Table 11 examines whether this is a non-linear relationship between profitability 
and the weight of residential mortgage loans as specified in Equation (6). Specifications III 
and IV, which look at non-investment banks for the pre-crisis period, reject the hypothesis 
of a non-linear relationship, as a function of bank risk, between profitability and residential 
mortgage exposure. However, conversely, specifications I and II support the hypothesis 
that there is a U-shaped non-linear relationship. The coefficients of the interaction 
variables, RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 and RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)
2, are negative and positive, 
respectively, and statistically significant at conventional levels. The results of the F-statistic 
to test for the significance of the linear and quadratic terms, separately and together, reveal 
that the coefficients of these variables are statistically significant, contributing towards 
increasing the explanatory power of the regression. If we analyze the roots of specifications 
I and II, we find risk variable to have the value of 0.0206 and 0.0944 (specification I) and 
0.0231 and 0.0846 (specification II). Until 2.06% and 2.31%, for specification I and II, 
respectively, the effect of weight of residential mortgage loans on bank’s profitability is 
positive – in our database, approximately 94.96% and 97.36%, for specification I and II, 
respectively, of the observations are of banks with a risk variable lower than these values. 
Between 2.06% and 9.44% (specification I) and 2.31% and 8.46% (specification II), the 
effect becomes negative – approximately 4.63% (specification I) and 2.09% (specification 
II) of the observations are of banks with a risk variable between these values. Finally, above 
9.44% (specification I) and 8.46% (specification II), the effect is again positive, but only 
0.41% (specification I) and 0.55% (specification II) have a risk variable higher. Given that 
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the vast majority of values for the risk variable in our database are lower than the first root 
in specifications I and II, we may conclude that this U-shaped relation is almost equal to a 
linear relation with downward trend.  
With regard to the control variables, the lagged PROFIT variable reveals a 
statistically significant positive sign. In the majority of the specifications, credit risk, 
liquidity risk, interest rate risk and the concentration index are also statistically significant 
with a positive effect on banks’ profitability. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g. 
Angbazo, 1997). The results also illustrate that inefficient banks tend to have lower 
profitability margins, in line with studies such as Maudos and Guevara (2004).  The positive 
statistically significant sign associated with the solvency ratio, in the majority of 
specifications, could suggest that banks require a premium in their margins, due to the 
pressures of ensuring solvency by regulators. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the ΔLOAN variable (loan growth rate) suggests that banks that register high 
loan growth may be required to work with lower banking margins, as suggested by Petersen 
and Rajan (1995) and supported by the findings of Valverde and Fernandéz (2007). The 
IPP variable (implicit interest payments) has a positive coefficient and is statistically 
significant, for the majority of regressions. This variable reflects extra payments to 
depositors through service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition 
in the market for deposits. These extra payments tend to cause an increase in the banks 
gross margins consistent with the results of Angbazo (1997). The GDP growth rate also 
shows a positive and statistically significant effect on banks’ gross margins. Finally, the 
dummy associated with the structure of financial systems, reveals that a bank-based system 
tends to produce larger gross margins than countries that operate a market-based financial 
system. 
The coefficient associated with the country’s average LTV ratio, which is acting as a 
proxy for the institutional characteristics of the mortgage market, is positive and statistical 
significant. This would suggest that banks in countries where credit-granting practices are 
less conservative (high leverage ratios) tend to require a higher profitability margins. Finally, 
the non-rejection of the null hypotheses of the Sargan test and the second-order 
autocorrelation test allow us to conclude drawn from the estimated models appear 
supported. We find that the basic results do not change when we apply static panel data 
procedures or when we estimate the regression without time fixed effects17.  
                                                 
17 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has evaluated the effects of residential mortgage loan lending on the risk 
and profitability of a sample over 500 EU-15 banks. The sample, running from 1995 
through 2008 captures much of the recent cycle, and especially the increase in residential 
lending observed in many markets prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. The results illustrate 
the importance of residential property lending and the significant impact it may have on 
bank performance. Broadly, the results indicate that increasing residential mortgage lending 
during strong property market conditions, in our case pre-2007, leads to an improvement 
in the performance of banks. This is found to be the case both with respect to profitability 
and credit risk. These findings can in part be explained by the fact that the asset is used as 
collateral to obtain other loans and is perceived by banks as contributing towards reducing 
credit risk.   
When we take into account the behaviour and dynamics of the residential property 
market we find that impact of increasing property prices on banks’ lending behavior is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the financial accelerator. Increasing residential 
property prices encourage banks to lend more, and risk premiums shrink when property 
prices rise. The results show that the decrease in credit risk as result of an increase in the 
weight of residential mortgage loans is higher during an upturn in the property cycle and in 
countries with more conservative lending practices. However, the results also illustrate that 
bank profitability tends to decrease during an upturn in the residential market. The results 
do also appear to indicate that house price appreciation leads to a fall in provisions and in 
non-performing loans. Whilst this in part may be due to the fact that mortgage loans rarely 
default during periods of price appreciation, there are other considerations. It may also be 
the result of banks delay provisions, with the result that risk emerges at a later date. The 
results highlight the need to develop indicators of bank’s individual exposure to the real 
estate market in order to calibrate the potential impact of changes in weights and prices of 
residential housing assets on bank risk and profitability. As Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) 
have shown, deviations from fundamental value of real estate tend to contribute to bank 
instability. These results given the policy of delaying the recognition of loan losses 
provisions may be more fully captured by a wider temporal sample. 
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 Table 1: EU-15 Mortgage and Housing Markets 
This table shows the values of residential mortgage loans, as percentage of GDP and per capita and total value of residential mortgage loans across EU-15 countries, for three 
different time periods: 1999, 2006 and 2008. We also present the percentage of owner occupied residential houses and outstanding covered bounds as percentage of residential lending  
in 2008 and the real house prices growth rate across EU-15 countries between 1997 and 2006. The values were obtained from European Mortgage Federation (Hypostat 2008 and 2006 
– A Review of Europe’s Mortgage and Housing Markets) and ECB (2005 and 2010). 
Country 
1999 2006 2008 1997-2006 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans as % 
GDP 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans per 
capita 
(€ 000s) 
Loans from 
Credit 
Institutions 
for Housing 
Purchase 
 (€ million) 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans as 
% GDP 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans per 
capita 
(€ 000s) 
Loans from 
Credit 
Institutions 
for Housing 
Purchase 
 (€ million) 
% Owner 
Occupied 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans as % 
GDP 
Residential 
Mortgage 
Loans per 
capita 
(€ 000s) 
Loans from 
Credit 
Institutions 
for Housing 
Purchase 
 (€ million) 
Outstanding 
Covered 
Bounds as % 
of Residential 
Lending 
Real House 
Prices 
(National) 
Growth 
(%) 
Austria 13.7% 3.69 23,620 23.5% 7.34 60,737 57.0% 25.3% 8.56 71,346 11.8% -7,20% 
Belgium 27.6% 6.44 51,487 36.3% 10.86 107,378 78.0% 39.8% 12.86 86,346 n/a 98,07% 
Denmark 76.2% 23.41 123,373 100.8% 40.90 217,629 54.0% 95.3% 40.57 253,168 100.0% 93,20% 
Finland 30.3% 7.22 22,020 43.8% 13.93 55,307 59.0% 47.5% 16.67 67,633 n/a 74,04% 
France 20.8% 4.74 280,963 32.2% 9.17 569,975 57.4% 35.9% 10.99 691,182 n/a 110,29% 
Germany 55.6% 13.64 839,788 51.3% 14.36 976,123 43.2% 46.1% 13.96 959,840 18.9% -10,63% 
Greece 7.3% 0.79 8,518 29.3% 5.14 52,313 80.6% 32.0% 6.93 65,267 6.4% 73,40% 
Ireland 28.9% 7.02 24,944 70.1% 29.29 111,403 74.5% 80.0% 33.75 115,233 15.5% 147,07% 
Italy 9.0% 1.78 80,354 18.7% 4.70 244,409 80.0% 19.8% 5.23 264,414 n/a 60,57% 
Luxembourg 22.4% 10.43 4,744 34.3% 24.69 12,208 75.0% 43.5% 32.93 15,940 0.9% 72,53% 
Netherlands 60.8% 14.90 190,626 98.4% 32.20 369,642 57.0% 99.1% 35.94 375,656 3.6% 84,71% 
Portugal 36.9% 4.16 42,208 59.2% 8.69 91,916 76.0% 63.3% 9.91 105,222 11.5% 7,18% 
Spain 26.7% 3.88 145,627 58.6% 13.07 551,506 84.5% 62.0% 14.89 658,094 46.7% 116,90% 
Sweden 46.4% 12.47 6,154 56.7% 19.18 125,746 52.0% 60.6% 21.68 128,484 63.5% 101,33% 
UK 54.2% 12.82 793,797 83.1% 26.22 1,152,822 59.0% 80.5% 23.64 787,213 12.9% 138,19% 
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Table 2: Residential Housing Prices Series 
The table presents the sources of residential house price series with its description, source, prices type, dwelling type, geographical coverage and first observation. All these series were 
deflated using CPI. All series were obtained from Bank International Settlements (BIS): BIS House Prices. 
Country Dwelling Dwelling Type Geographical Coverage Prices Description of Index Period Source 
Austria 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. Vienna Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1976  - 
Central Bank of Austria 
(www.oenb.at) 
Belgium 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Small and medium sized 
dwellings for sale by mutual 
agreement. 
Nationwide Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1988 - 
STADIM (private 
consultancy) 
(www.stadim.be) 
Denmark 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses, flats and holiday homes. 
Nationwide (data collected at 
municipal level). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price per square meter for 
municipalities weighted with the dwelling 
stock. 
1971 - 
Danish Mortgage 
Association 
(www.realkreditraadet.dk) 
Finland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. 
Large Cities (with more than 100.000 
inhabitants). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1978 - 
Central Bank of Finland 
(www.suomenpankki.fi) 
France 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Second-hand dwellings: more 
than 5 years old or sold a second 
time within the 1st  
5 years. 
Paris. 
 
Nationwide. 
Transaction Prices. 
Paris: Average price per square meter observed 
in sales. 
 
Country: Hedonic regression. 
1980 - 
 
1994 - 
Notaires – INSEE 
(www.insee.fr) 
Germany 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Property offering a good quality 
of life in average to good 
locations. 
Terraced houses and flats. 
Western Germany: Before 1989: 50 
towns/cities. 
From 1990 onwards: 100 towns/cities. 
From 1995 onwards: 125 towns/cities 
(100 towns/cities in Western Germany 
and 25 towns/cities in Eastern 
Germany) 
Typical values quantified 
by real estate experts who 
refer to price data of 
various types, including 
non-transaction prices. 
Prices weighted through population. 
Aggregation based on the share of terraced 
houses and flats in the total living área. 
1975 - 
Central Bank of Germany. 
Figures are based on data 
from BulwienGesa AG. 
(www.bundesbank.de) 
Greece 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A Athens and 17 major cities.  Transaction Prices. 
Prices weighted with the dwelling stock (in 
square meters) in Athens and 17 major cities. 
1994 - 
Central Bank of Greece 
(www.bankofgreece.gr) 
Ireland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All newly mortgaged residential 
property. 
Nationwide. 
Price at mortgage 
approval. 
Simple average of house price for new and 
second hand dwellings in the period in question. 
1971 - 
Department of the 
Environment 
(www.environ.ie) 
Italy 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A 13 large urban areas. Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1988 - 
NOMISMA 
(www.nomisma.it) 
Luxemburg 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Laspeyere price indices. 1974 - 
Central Bank of 
Luxembourg  (www.bcl.lu) 
Netherlands 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Detached house, corner house, 
terraced house, apartment, semi-
detached house. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Weighted repeat sales. 1976 - 
National Land Register 
(Kadaster) 
(www.kadaster.org) 
Spain 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All dwellings excluding those 
that have a market value over  
€1.050.000. 
Nationwide (data collected for 
provinces and municipalities with more 
than 25.000 inhabitants. 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations: “Open 
market appraised housing” 
Average price per square meter weighted with 
the number of valuations.  
1987 - 
Ministry of Housing 
(www.fomento.gob.es) 
Portugal 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide (exclude islands) 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations. 
Weighted price indices by hedonic regression 
and by housing type. 
1988 - 
Imométrica 
(www1.ipd.com) 
Sweden 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
One and two dwelling buildings. Nacional N/A 
Weighted average of the price indices of owner-
occupied adjusted for ratable values and based 
on the legal registration. 
1986 - 
Statistics Sweden 
(www.scb.se/) 
UK 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Detached house, semi-detached 
house, bungalow, terraced house 
and flats. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Mixed Adjusted 1969 - 
Department of Communities 
and Local Government 
(www.communities.gov.uk) 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Dependent Variables (Bank Credit Risk Proxies) 
PROVit-1 Ratio of loan loss provision to net loans from the previous period. The current ratio is closely related to that of the previous period, since 
loan loss provisions are not immediately written down in the bank balance sheet.  
Positive 
NPLit-1 
Ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans from the previous period.  
Positive 
Control Variables  
GDPt-h Real GDP Growth Rate. Measures the impact of aggregated economic activity. The larger the economic growth the lower the degree of 
default by economic agents.  
Negative 
DFAMt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Families and the GDP. This ratio measures the families’ indebtedness level.  
Positive 
DEMPt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Company and GDP. This ratio measures the company’s indebtedness level.  
Positive 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-h 
Ratio between Total Credit and Total Assets lagged one, two and three periods. A target of rapid increase in market share can force the 
bank to reduce the quality of its borrowers. However, since the loan is granted till it becomes a provision loans, there is a lag unknown 
and variable. In order to measure the temporal effects, we allow three lags, starting at t-1. If it were lagged less are than one period, it 
could be spuriously correlated with the dependent variable through the denominator.  
Positive 
INEFit Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the ratio “Operating Costs to Gross Income”. A higher value for the ratio indicates that there are 
management inefficiencies. It is expected that banks with better management in place have a lower level of loan provisions. 
Positive 
SIZEit 
Bank’s Relative Dimension provided by the ratio between bank assets i and total bank assets, during the period t. As we noted in section 
2.2.2.1, some authors use this variable to measure risk diversification policies. A big balance sheet allows the managers to invest in 
different geographical or business segments to deal with asymmetric shocks. If the relative size is a good proxy for risk diversification, we 
should find a negative coefficient. On the other hand, this variable may capture the bank’s market power. In this situation, we should 
expected a positive sign for the coefficient, because when the bank increases the market power, increase the probability of granting credit 
to companies with a higher credit risk. 
Positive or 
Negative 
MARGINit-h 
Bank Interest Margin obtained by the variable “Net Interest Margin”, lagged two and three periods. This variable is a measure of the 
difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest paid to their lenders (for example, deposits), 
relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. The present variable 
not only reflects the profitability of bank credit, but also incorporates a risk premium. The increased risk will tend to provoke an increase 
in the gross margin, for which reason the variables are lagged.  
Positive 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio is provided by the ratio between Capital and Total Assets, lagged two and three periods. The impact of solvency 
difficulties is not straightforward. The loans provisions will appear later because it takes time to change credit policy. The higher the 
solvency ratio, the lower the incentives to take more risks. Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for the coefficient. Nevertheless, 
lower capital ratios may induce banks to “gamble for resurrection”, thereby causing the opposite impacts on bank decisions.  
Positive or 
Negative 
PREMit-3 
Credit Risk Premium. The higher ex post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank charging an ex ante risk premium in the interest of the 
loans. To control for this effect, we include PREMit-3 (the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest 
rate) as a proxy for the risk premium. The tree-year lags is designed to catch the ex ante component of risk premium. If the riskier loans 
are properly priced, the coefficient associated to the variable should be positive and statistically significant. However, it is possible that a 
positive impact may not be found if strong competition induces cross-subsidization of products inside banks.  
Positive 
RMShareit 
The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. 
? 
RPPRICEt-1 The rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the 
real estate market is at a regional level). Detailed information about residential housing price series appears in table 2. 
? 
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Table 4: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Dependent Variables (Bank Profitability Proxies) 
NIMIt-1 
Bank Interest Margin from the previous period.  
Positive 
ROAIt-1 
Return on Assets from the previous period.  
Positive 
Control Variables 
GDPt-h 
Real GDP growth rate. The relationship between the bank margins and growth will depend on the correlation between prices, costs and 
the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank prices and costs, although the extent to which these variables are 
affected may be significantly different, meaning that the net effect on margin may not be clearly determined (Carbó et al., 2003).  
Positive or 
Negative 
BBMBt 
Bank-Based or Market-Based System. A dummy variable is used in order to show the potential effects of the differences in the bank 
margins according to the structure of the financial system. The dummy take the value 1 if the bank operates in a bank-based system and 
the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. Valverde and Fernández (2007) found positive and negative signs, statistically 
significant, for this proxy. 
Positive or 
Negative 
RISKit-h 
Credit Risk defined by the value of the ratio “Loan Loss Provisions to Net Loans” lagged into two and three periods. The values of this ratio 
are lagged since risk parameters are not expected to affect margins contemporaneously. A greater risk premium should be required by the 
bank when the credit risk increases. 
Positive 
LIQit-h Liquidity risk provided by the ratio “Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding”. The risk of insufficient liquidity may force banks to request 
emergency funds at excessive cost. Angbazo (1997) states that the liquidity risk tends to affect bank margin positively. 
Positive 
SDR3M it-h 
Volatility of the Market Interest Rate is used as the proxy for the interest rate risk. The uncertainty in the money market is reflected in the 
theoretical model by the variance of the market interest rate. The empirical proxy for this variable is consequently based on a 
measurement of volatility of the market interest rate, such as the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank interest rate at 3 
months. The variable is lagged since the volatility of the market interest rate is not expected to affect the gross margin 
contemporaneously. It is expected that the interest rate risk increases banks’ gross margin (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).  
Positive 
HHIt 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index computed from banks total assets on the domestic market. In theory, the level of concentration of 
banking activity and banks’ gross margins tend to be positively related. However, this relationship may be influenced by third variables 
and the gross margins can be negatively affected by market concentration (see for example, Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). The HHI 
variable was obtained from two reports from the European Central Bank (ECB, 2005 and 2010). 
Positive or 
Negative 
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Table 4: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
INEFit 
Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the “Cost to Income Ratio”. The existence of high operating costs implies increased operating 
inefficiency. Therefore, we expect those banks experiencing higher costs to increase prices to a greater extent (if they enjoy market 
power), so that inefficiency will result in higher margins (Altunbas et al., 2001). Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that this proxy may, 
alternatively, indicate the quality or efficiency of the management. There tends to be higher quality management when there is a lucrative 
composition of assets and a low cost composition of liabilities. Thus a higher ratio would imply lesser management efficiency or quality, 
which would reflect lower gross margins. 
Positive or 
Negative 
ΔLOANit 
Average Dimension of Operations or Credit Volume. In the estimation we use the loans growth rate as proxy. In the model developed by 
Maudos and Guevara (2004), the gross margins are a growing function of the average dimension of the operations realized. The reason 
for this is that for a certain risk value and market risk, a large operation will tend to involve greater risk of potential loss, so the bank will 
tend to require a greater margin. Thus, the potential loss will tend to be greater for banks with a high volume of credit volume. Davis and 
Zhu (2009) refer that if the bank’s risk attitude remains the same across the credit cycle, its profitability should be higher as a 
compensation for the higher credit risk. Nevertheless, if the risk-taking behaviour is associated with distorted incentives, such as the 
“disaster myopia” tendency mentioned before, its linkage with bank profitability is more ambiguous. 
Positive or 
Negative 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio provided by “Capital to Assets Ratio”. Valverde and Fernández (2007) state that debt substitution for capital, lower the 
bank’s insolvency risk and possibly decrease the funding costs for the bank. But as the capital is becoming a more costly source of 
funding, an increase in equity tends to increase the average cost of the capital. Thus, a higher gross margin will tend to be required ex-ante. 
Davis and Zhu (2009) state that the solvency ratio may have two opposite effects on bank profitability. If the cost-of-funding effect 
dominates, a higher equity ratio leads to higher bank profitability. If the “gamble for resurrection” effect dominates instead, banks with lower 
capitalisation will invest more on high-risk assets and the loan quality is impaired. 
Positive or 
Negative 
IPPit 
Implicit Interest Payments. Following Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000), the proxy “(Non-
Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues)/Total Assets” is used to measure the implicit interest payments. This variable reflects extra 
payments to depositors through service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition in the market for deposits. These 
extra interest expenses should be mirrored in higher interest margins. 
Positive 
RPPRICEit-1 
Rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level) or the accumulated rate of growth in real terms of residential housing prices. Detailed information 
about residential housing price series appears in table 1. 
? 
RMShareit The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. ? 
 Table 5: Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization 
This table shows the banks distribution by country and specialization. The sample was obtained from the database 
BANKSCOPE. We only consider banks with more than three consecutive years of observations between 1995 and 
2008. The banks’ specialization is in agreement with the classification used by database BANKSCOPE. The 
specialization category “Others” includes: “Bank Holdings & Holding Companies”, “Savings Banks” and 
“Investment Banks”. 
Country 
Number of Banks 
Commercial Cooperative 
Real Estate & 
Mortgage 
Others Total 
Austria 16 9 5 10 40 
Belgium 8 1 0 5 14 
Denmark 40 0 2 12 54 
Finland 5 0 0 1 6 
France 37 50 3 5 95 
Germany 28 6 3 10 47 
Greece  13 0 0 1 14 
Ireland 11 0 3 1 15 
Italy 27 16 0 17 60 
Luxembourg 11 1 0 2 14 
Netherlands 18 1 1 6 26 
Portugal  7 1 1 9 18 
Spain1 22 5 0 43 70 
Sweden 5 0 4 7 16 
United Kingdom 24 0 34 8 66 
Total 272 90 56 137 555 
1 
The column relating to “Others” has only Saving Banks given the importance of the Cajas de Ahorros in 
Spain. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the 555 European Banks in the period between 1999 and 2008. 
As proxies of the bank’s credit risk (RISK) we used the ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans 
(NPL) and the ratio of loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV); GDP is the real GDP growth; 
DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities 
of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of 
operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is 
the net interest margin (gross margin) – one of the proxies for bank profitability; ROA is the return on assets 
(proxy for bank profitability); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained 
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio 
net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month 
interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the 
ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – 
non-interest revenues)/total assets; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; LTV is the average loan to value ratio 
in the country where the bank operates; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total 
bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices. 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum  
NPL (%) 2.843 2.075 3.043 0 44.400 
PROV (%) 0.662 0.366 0.834 -2.297 35.353 
GDP (%) 2.001 2.000 1.469 -3.000 6.500 
DFAM (%) 72.871 63.720 27.989 24.240 148.280 
DEMP (%) 201.861 192.850 49.795 90.230 379.400 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS  59.055 65.622 22.824 0.523 99.130 
INEF (%) 62.783 61.900 30.818 0.000 254.050 
SIZE (%) 2.281 0.231 6.472 0.000 58.183 
NIM (%) 2.613 1.925 10.533 -2.870 13.230 
ROA (%) 0.707 0.560 1.764 -6.045 10.245 
EQUITY (%) 8.317 6.719 6.745 -0.465 94.552 
PREM (%) 1.890 1.532 13.444 -5.269 12.992 
LIQ (%) 84.894 76.719 5.400 0.000 320.084 
SDR3M 0.411 0.351 0.127 0.023 0.888 
HH 685.148 551.000 489.445 158.000 3160.000 
IPP (%) 1.187 0.752 15.862 -6.972 2.820 
ΔLOAN (%) 14.612 1.111 13.044 -37.672 54.000 
LTV (%) 90.919 85.000 16.835 60.000 112.000 
RMSHARE (%) 30.943 28.088 21.234 0.000 99.443 
RPPRICE (%) 4.841 5.615 6.590 -14.742 23.222 
 Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Country 
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and 2008. As proxies of the bank’s credit risk (RISK) we used the ratio of non-
performing loans and the total of loans (NPL) and the ratio of loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV); GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of 
families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the net interest margin (gross margin) – one of the proxies for bank profitability; ROA is the return on assets (proxy 
for bank profitability); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; LIQ 
is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets 
on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; ΔLOAN is the loans 
growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices. The table reports 
the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The standard deviation comes in brackets. 
 GER AUS BEL DEN SPA FIN FRA GRE NET IRL ITA LUX POR UK SWE 
NPL (%) 
2.748 
(2.88) 
3.663 
(3.49) 
1.102 
(1.85) 
2.822 
(2.49) 
2.122 
(2.02) 
1.304 
(1.24) 
2.006 
(1.91) 
4.656 
(2.64) 
4.558 
(3.34) 
1.848 
(1.76) 
2.946 
(2.51) 
2.528 
(2.36) 
3.221 
(2.77) 
1.649 
(2.07) 
2.358 
(2.55) 
PROV (%) 0.441 
(3.30) 
0.853 
(6.04) 
0.210 
(0.62) 
0.657 
(0.99) 
0.494 
(0.28) 
0.093 
(0.21) 
0.467 
(2.00) 
1.317 
(1.90) 
1.760 
(7.14) 
0.244 
(0.57) 
0.686 
(1.06) 
0.123 
(0.038) 
0.750 
(0.90) 
0.384 
(1.40) 
0.549 
(5.26) 
GDP (%) 1.172 
(1.03) 
2.095 
(1.06) 
1.927 
(0.95) 
1.270 
(1.30) 
3.107 
(0.91) 
3.175 
(1.24) 
1.647 
(0.69) 
3.764 
(1.35) 
1.991 
(1.17) 
4.509 
(3.02) 
0.824 
(1.02) 
3.927 
(2.18) 
0.879 
(0.90) 
2.329 
(0.75) 
2.320 
(1.44) 
DFAM (%) 
69.159 
(3.89) 
51.522 
(2.58) 
43.030 
(4.01) 
125.740 
(13.42) 
74.136 
(12.19) 
46.452 
(9.15) 
55.712 
(5.80) 
40.782 
(12.13) 
109.062 
(11.06) 
82.717 
(21.04) 
38.852 
(5.66)) 
55.554 
(5.84) 
93.025 
(9.41) 
97.738 
(10.08) 
68.591 
(6.58) 
DEMP (%) 169.207 
(9.50) 
153.853 
(24.34) 
240.480 
(31.89) 
172.505 
(23.11) 
200.300 
(29.65) 
213.366 
(19.22) 
205.644 
(25.19) 
107.190 
(13.67) 
239.409 
(15.10) 
278.896 
(26.49) 
146.100 
(8.47) 
317.992 
(34.70) 
241.243 
(9.30) 
253.201 
(19.79) 
264.141 
(26.80) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS 0.479 
(0.235) 
0.554 
(0.194) 
0.420 
(0.201) 
0.650 
(0.107) 
0.679 
(0.150) 
0.563 
(0.262) 
0.586 
(0.259) 
0.612 
(0.150) 
0.495 
(0.278) 
0.527 
(0.249) 
0.611 
(0.225) 
0.308 
(0.163) 
0.583 
(0.229) 
0.662 
(0.203) 
0.672 
(0.277) 
INEF (%) 72.971 
(32.29) 
66.592 
(31.87) 
64.568 
(18.93) 
58.308 
(16.53) 
60.184 
(31.06) 
67.547 
(18.66) 
63.525 
(28.63) 
71.475 
(36.21) 
63.553 
(34.44) 
63.505 
(18.39) 
45.31 
(44.18) 
54.415 
(23.10) 
61.305 
(13.80) 
62.985 
(17.88) 
55.020 
(29.26) 
SIZE (%) 0.893 
(2.42) 
2.897 
(5.02) 
11.991 
(17.98) 
1.519 
(5.20) 
1.413 
(4.01) 
16.002 
(27.90) 
1.203 
(3.59) 
5.929 
(6.74) 
2.672 
(6.24) 
2.584 
(3.24) 
0.975 
(3.25) 
4.723 
(4.38) 
4.184 
(5.75) 
0.682 
(1.71) 
7.054 
(10.84) 
NIM (%) 6.573 
(35.66) 
1.892 
(1.31) 
1.749 
(1.56) 
3.763 
(1.66) 
2.305 
(0.81) 
2.035 
(1.18) 
1.950 
(1.37) 
2.921 
(1.03) 
1.478 
(0.99) 
1.256 
(0.77) 
2.769 
(1.33) 
0.959 
(0.53) 
2.477 
(1.30) 
1.997 
(1.82) 
1.563 
(1.05) 
ROA (%) 0.207 
(3.53) 
0.581 
(2.07) 
0.734 
(0.91) 
1.312 
(0.95) 
0.796 
(0.98) 
0.803 
(0.66) 
0.920 
(2.16) 
0.305 
(1.29) 
0.478 
(0.91) 
0.771 
(1.18) 
0.679 
(1.09) 
0.680 
(0.66) 
0.753 
(0.81) 
0.769 
(1.34) 
0.856 
(0.97) 
EQUITY (%) 6.581 
(8.92) 
7.525 
(9.93) 
5.279 
(2.59) 
11.917 
(4.99) 
7.907 
(3.56) 
7.158 
(2.89) 
8.907 
(4.76) 
8.715 
(6.51) 
6.476 
(3.55) 
5.184 
(2.89) 
9.978 
(6.24) 
5.253 
(2.36) 
8.417 
(8.21) 
7.859 
(9.18) 
8.460 
(8.69) 
PREM (%) 2.350 
(5.29) 
1.798 
(2.17) 
2.132 
(3.61) 
2.021 
(1.52) 
1.175 
(1.11) 
0.245 
(1.34) 
1.810 
(1.66) 
2.303 
(1.47) 
1.765 
(3.39) 
1.006 
(1.61) 
1.823 
(3.36) 
3.930 
(3.82) 
2.216 
(1.97) 
2.413 
(37.99) 
0.951 
(1.35) 
LIQ (%) 70.603 
(5.45) 
100.21 
(8.24) 
59.634 
(2.93) 
133.24 
(2.90) 
92.96 
(3.13) 
80.64 
(3.84) 
132.55 
(4.92) 
72.56 
(2.46) 
135.11 
(2.35) 
84.65 
(4.06) 
120.23 
(9.46) 
41.58 
(2.57) 
85.69 
(3.47) 
93.97 
(7.94) 
179.31 
(2.14) 
SDR3M 
0.295 
(0.17) 
0.304 
(0.18) 
0.299 
(0.17) 
0.301 
(0.17) 
1.100 
(1.18) 
0.299 
(0.18) 
0.304 
(0.18) 
0.296 
(0.17) 
0.285 
(0.16) 
0.295 
(0.17) 
0.295 
(0.17) 
0.289 
(0.18) 
0.296 
(0.17) 
0.384 
(0.24) 
0.346 
(0.16) 
HH 174.75 
(9.85) 
545.37 
(42.97) 
1971.00 
(167.74) 
1132.37 
(42.50) 
496.00 
(34.12) 
2547.50 
(316.47) 
648.75 
(60.00) 
1117.75 
(33.24) 
1841.75 
(136.60) 
597.87 
(81.96) 
265.25 
(43.86) 
293.75 
(15.10) 
1073.75 
(64.16) 
370.75 
(52.12) 
845.25 
(67.58) 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics by Country (cont.) 
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and 2008. As proxies of the bank’s credit risk (RISK) we used the ratio of non-
performing loans and the total of loans (NPL) and the ratio of loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV); GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of 
families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the net interest margin (gross margin) – one of the proxies for bank profitability; ROA is the return on assets (proxy 
for bank profitability); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; LIQ 
is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets 
on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; ΔLOAN is the loans 
growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices. The table reports 
the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The standard deviation comes in brackets. 
 GER AUS BEL DEN SPA FIN FRA GRE NET IRL ITA LUX POR UK SWE 
IPP (%) 2.423 
(36.1) 
0.912 
(2.3) 
0.423 
(1.1) 
1.422 
(1.2) 
1.323 
(5.2) 
0.523 
(1.2) 
0.323 
(3.2) 
1.623 
(2.2) 
0.523 
(1.2) 
0.223 
(1.6) 
1.723 
(13.1) 
0.156 
(1.4) 
0.934 
(1.6) 
0.534 
(30.4) 
0.223 
(3.2) 
ΔLOAN (%) 7.221 
(57.8) 
11.767 
(20.85) 
9.208 
(31.7) 
16.101 
(15.93) 
31.239 
(29.53) 
15.329 
(51.7) 
12.719 
(65.0) 
38.086 
(23.5) 
36.167 
(54.8) 
23.905 
(69.9) 
25.373 
(63.3) 
12.651 
(25.7) 
22.206 
(46.4) 
6.254 
(22.8) 
23.940 
(62.2) 
RMSHARE (%) 
20.032 
(17.0) 
20.902 
(11.1) 
16.932 
(10.8) 
27.923 
(14.2) 
35.623 
(15.2) 
29.734 
(21.2) 
29.821 
(18.3) 
23.523 
(11.2) 
24.232 
(23.2) 
32.321 
(26.2) 
26.823 
(15.2) 
11.012 
(8.3) 
26.121 
(15.2) 
34.523 
(28.2) 
31.623 
(26.9) 
RPPRICE (%) 0.318 
(0.70) 
1.903 
(4.93) 
7.373 
(3.09) 
5.271 
(8.11) 
7.472 
(6.14) 
5.510 
(8.20) 
7.296 
(6.60) 
4.536 
(4.76) 
2.568 
(1.05) 
4.210 
(6.90) 
5.188 
(2.01) 
6.316 
(4.55) 
-2.255 
(2.16) 
4.791 
(10.12) 
5.618 
(4.11) 
Table 8: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Panel A: Bank’s Risk Proxy: Non-Performing Loans (NPL)   
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable NPL is the 
ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This 
variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the 
ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured 
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained 
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the 
residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international 
exposure to the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates.  We 
use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented 
in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV V VI 
NPLit-1 0.0768
c 
(1.75) 
0.0765c 
(1.73) 
0.0801c 
(1.81) 
0.1915a 
(3.06) 
0.2229a 
(3.89) 
0.1063c 
(1.98) 
GDPt -0.0464
a 
(-4.27) 
-0.0463a 
(-4.25) 
-0.0624a 
(-5.11) 
-0.0311a 
(-3.30) 
-0.0582a 
(-8.73) 
-0.0526a 
(-4.46) 
GDPt-1 -0.0373
a 
(-3.60) 
-0.0373a 
(-3.59) 
-0.0371a 
(-3.38) 
-0.0280a 
(-3.01) 
-0.0335a 
(-6.29) 
-0.0425a 
(-4.02) 
DFAMt 0.0066
b 
(2.04) 
0.0066b 
(2.02) 
0.0091a 
(2.86) 
0.0107a 
(3.66) 
0.0103a 
(3.45) 
0.0068b 
(1.99) 
DEMPt 0.0006 
(1.08) 
0.0006 
(1.04) 
0.0006 
(1.03) 
-0.0010a 
(-2.88) 
-0.0008a 
(-4.17) 
0.0006 
(0.98) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0.1099
b 
(2.63) 
0.1058b 
(2.52) 
0.1285a 
(2.88) 
0.3573a 
(2.91) 
0.3992a 
(2.87) 
0.1049c 
(1.87) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 0.0790 
(0.68) 
0.0782 
(0.68) 
0.0637 
(0.47) 
-0.3213b 
(-2.26) 
-0.3235b 
(-2.17) 
-0.0285 
(-0.29) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 0.1001 
(0.63) 
0.1001 
(0.64) 
0.0777 
(0.45) 
0.1009 
(0.99) 
0.0743 
(0.72) 
0.0468 
(0.31) 
INEFit 0.0006 
(1.13) 
0.0006 
(1.13) 
0.0008 
(1.57) 
0.0006 
(1.24) 
0.0003 
(0.82) 
0.0006 
(1.02) 
SIZEit -2.7257
a 
(-3.63) 
-2.7249a 
(-3.62) 
-3.1320a 
(-4.92) 
-2.2740a 
(-3.07) 
-2.2731a 
(-3.08) 
-2.4447a 
(-3.89) 
NIMit-2 0.0019
b 
(2.46) 
0.0019b 
(2.46) 
0.0017c 
(1.80) 
0.0020a 
(3.78) 
0.0017a 
(3.18) 
0.0017c 
(1.87) 
NIMit-3 -0.0055 
(-1.36) 
-0.0055 
(-1.35) 
-0.0053 
(-1.21) 
-0.0014 
(-1.01) 
-0.0011 
(-0.90) 
-0.0062 
(-1.39) 
EQUITYit-2 0.3347 
(0.80) 
0.3324 
(0.79) 
0.4216 
(0.99) 
-0.1399 
(-0.46) 
-0.1755 
(-0.54) 
0.2768 
(0.64) 
EQUITYit-3 0.4914 
(1.24) 
0.4939 
(1.24) 
0.6149 
(1.43) 
-0.0878 
(-0.32) 
-0.1335 
(-0.46) 
0.4805 
(1.19) 
PREMit-3 0.0347 
(1.52) 
0.0347 
(1.51) 
0.0326 
(1.28) 
0.0096 
(0.52) 
0.0036 
(0.58) 
0.0357 
(1.54) 
RMSHAREit -1.4450
a 
(-5.45) 
-1.4388a 
(-5.41) 
 -0.8446a 
(-5.38) 
 -1.5299a 
(-5.85) 
RPPRICEt-1 
  -0.0524c 
(-1.90) 
 -0.0041c 
(-1.86) 
 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0.0086
a 
     (-2.86) 
-0.0094c 
(-1.94) 
-0.0093a 
(-3.58) 
-0.0156a 
(-3.31) 
-0.0067a 
(-2.75) 
LTVt    0.1028
b 
(1.99) 
0.1022c 
(1.74) 
 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008     1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 4540     4540 4540 4540   4540 4540 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.270     0.265 0.291 0.273   0.268 0.271 
AR (1) and p-value -3.0a (0.00)  -2.8a (0.00) -2.9a (0.00) -2.8a (0.00)   -2.0b (0.04)  -2.0b (0.04) 
AR (2) and p-value -0.4  (0.77)   0.4 (0.79) -1.2  (0.25) -0.6  (0.61)   -1.1  (0.29)  -1.0  (0.26) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel B: Bank’s Risk Proxy: Loan Losses Provisions (PROV)   
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable PROV is 
the ratio of loan losses provisions and the total of net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). 
This variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM 
is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and 
GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is 
obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE 
is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of 
the residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international 
exposure to the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates.  We 
use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented 
in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV V VI 
PROVit-1 -0.3599
a 
(-4.32) 
-0.3610a 
(-4.40) 
-0.3598a 
(-4.11) 
-0.3736a 
(-4.20) 
-0.3746a 
(-4.33) 
-0.3590a 
(-4.42) 
GDPt -0.0982
a 
(-5.94) 
-0.0933a 
(-5.62) 
-0.0899a 
(-5.40) 
-0.1228a 
(-9.17) 
-0.1233a 
(-9.32) 
-0.0980a 
(-3.89) 
GDPt-1 -0.0778
a 
 (-4.48) 
-0.0739a 
 (-4.25) 
-0.0699a 
(-3.99) 
-0.0282b 
(-2.01) 
-0.0276b 
(-2.02) 
-0.0777a 
(-3.77) 
DFAMt 0.0032
b 
(1.97) 
0.0036b 
(1.99) 
0.0043c 
(1.76) 
0.0172a 
(2.85) 
0.0181a 
(2.99) 
0.0033c 
(1.79) 
DEMPt -0.0013 
(-1.47) 
-0.0011 
(-1.26) 
-0.0009 
(1.03) 
-0.0014 
(-1.59) 
-0.0010 
(-1.22) 
-0.0012 
(-0.99) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0.3047
c 
(1.75) 
0.3084c 
(1.82) 
0.3373c 
(1.88) 
0.2090c 
(1.68) 
0.2539c 
(1.77) 
0.3035c 
(1.84) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 0.0389 
(0.18) 
0.0693 
(0.31) 
0.0643 
(0.29) 
0.2795 
(1.16) 
0.2472 
(1.03) 
0.0376 
(0.15) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0.0297 
(-0.13) 
-0.0567 
(-0.24) 
-0.0901 
(-0.38) 
0.0884 
(0.34) 
0.0349 
(0.89) 
-0.0291 
(-0.11) 
INEFit 0.0014 
(1.34) 
0.0006 
(1.12) 
0.0004 
(1.14) 
0.0005 
(0.32) 
0.0003 
(0.20) 
0.0004 
(0.33) 
SIZEit -0.4494
 
(-0.54) 
-0.4795 
(-0.65) 
-0.5606 
(-0.76) 
-0.5555 
(-1.05) 
-0.6260 
(-1.17) 
-0.4482 
(-0.84) 
NIMit-2 0.0017
b 
(2.57) 
0.0017b 
(2.52) 
0.0017b 
(2.48) 
0.0033a 
(2.85) 
0.0038a 
(2.73) 
0.0017c 
(1.90) 
NIMit-3 -0.0019 
(-0.57) 
-0.0023 
(-0.68) 
-0.0026 
(-0.77) 
-0.0003 
(-0.27) 
-0.0007 
(-0.52) 
-0.0019 
(-0.64) 
EQUITYit-2 -1.2752
b 
(-1.99) 
-1.2256c 
(-1.91) 
-1.1785c 
(-1.84) 
-1.1552c 
(-1.75) 
-0.9985c 
(-1.77) 
-1.2767c 
(-1.69) 
EQUITYit-3 0.3475 
(0.55) 
0.3259 
(0.53) 
0.2797 
(0.45) 
-0.0137 
(-0.13) 
-0.0350 
(-0.34) 
0.3496 
(0.39) 
PREMit-3 0.0116 
(1.32) 
0.0133 
(1.51) 
0.0145c 
(1.65) 
0.0063b 
(1.99) 
0.0064b 
(2.22) 
0.0116c 
(1.72) 
RMSHAREit -0.6104
a 
(-3.69) 
-0.5113a 
(-3.41) 
 -0.3958a 
(-2.89) 
 -0.6062a 
(-2.85) 
RPPRICEt-1 
  -0.0134c 
(-2.68) 
 -0.0179a 
(-3.23) 
 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0.0180
a 
(-2.60) 
-0.0062c 
(-1.79) 
-0.0338a 
(-4.69) 
-0.0070b 
(-2.23) 
-0.0055b 
(-2.16) 
LTVt    0.0211
b 
(2.11) 
0.0288c 
(1.99) 
 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008     1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 4540     4540 4540 4540   4540 4540 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.144     0.169 0.211 0.244   0.268 0.271 
AR (1) and p-value -2.6a (0.00)  -2.7a (0.00) -2.8a (0.00) -2.9a (0.00)   -2.7a (0.00) -2.5a (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value -0.2  (0.81)   0.4 (0.79) -1.3  (0.20) -0.5  (0.67)   -1.0  (0.36) -1.0  (0.26) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       Yes 
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Table 9: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis - Subsamples 
Panel A: Bank’s Risk Proxy: Non-Performing Loans (NPL)   
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples. We use the 
Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable NPL is the ratio 
of non-performing loans and the total of loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable 
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio 
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured 
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained 
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the 
domestic residential housing market prices. 
Regression I includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression II includes de banks of Spain, Ireland and UK. 
Regressions III and IV are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV 
NPLit-1 0.0382
b 
(2.35) 
0.2002a 
(8.33) 
0.1481b 
(2.27) 
0.3947a 
(16.30) 
GDPt -0.0363
c 
(-1.87) 
-0.1561a 
(-2.78) 
-0.0469a 
(-2.63) 
-0.0212b 
(-2.54) 
GDPt-1 -0.0382
b 
(-2.47) 
-0.0042 
(-0.28) 
-0.0576a 
(-3.03) 
-0.0067 
(-0.84) 
DFAMt 0.0180
a 
(3.56) 
0.0098b 
(2.42) 
0.0131c 
(1.89) 
0.0045b 
(2.10) 
DEMPt -0.0015
 
(-0.55) 
-0.0003 
(-0.27) 
-0.0006 
(-0.60) 
-0.0011c 
(-1.77) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0.2559
c 
(1.70) 
0.8617a 
(4.44) 
0.4921c 
(1.97) 
0.5146a 
(3.54) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0.2329
c 
(-1.69) 
0.0513 
(0.32) 
-0.1375 
(-0.87) 
0.1755 
(0.93) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0.0506 
(-0.32) 
0.0314 
(0.14) 
0.0425 
(0.16) 
0.3257c 
(1.72) 
INEFit 0.0023
a 
(3.63) 
0.0002 
(0.24) 
0.0011 
(1.56) 
0.0031b 
(2.30) 
SIZEit -7.9962
a 
(-4.69) 
-3.1020b 
(-2.02) 
-4.8550c 
(-1.68) 
-8.3614c 
(-1.67) 
NIMit-2 0.0007
 
(1.54) 
0.0700b 
(2.23) 
0.0013c 
(1.67) 
0.0458 
(1.31) 
NIMit-3 -0.0011
 
(-1.48) 
0.0647a 
(3.05) 
-0.0031 
(-1.36) 
-0.0068 
(-0.18) 
EQUITYit-2 0.8039
c 
(1.98) 
0.4614 
(0.59) 
0.2544 
(0.57) 
-0.7931 
(-1.55) 
EQUITYit-3 -0.6370
a 
(-2.94) 
-1.1641 
(-1.57) 
0.2221 
(0.52) 
-0.8719 
(-1.52) 
PREMit-3 0.0078
c 
(1.77) 
-0.0045 
(-0.34) 
0.0249c 
(1.86) 
0.0129 
(1.26) 
RMSHAREit -9.7012
a 
(-3.35) 
3.0927b 
(2.11) 
-15.4566a 
(-2.59) 
0.7686 
(0.45) 
RMSHAREit * RPPRICEt-1 0.0309
c 
(1.84) 
-0.0120a 
(-3.78) 
-0.0385b 
(-2.03) 
-0.0041b 
(-2.04) 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.185 0.144 0.370 0.188 
AR (1) and p-value   -5.0a  (0.00)  -2.6a   (0.00)  -2.8a  (0.00)  -3.3a (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0.3   (0.74)   0.2    (0.81)   0.3   (0.73)  -0.2   (0.83) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis - Subsamples (cont.) 
Panel B: Bank’s Risk Proxy: Loan Losses Provisions (PROV)   
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples. We use the 
Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable PROV is the ratio 
of loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV) and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This 
variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the 
ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured 
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained 
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the 
weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the 
domestic residential housing market prices. 
Regression I includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression II includes de banks of Spain, Ireland and UK. 
Regressions III and IV are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV 
PROVit-1 -0.3767
a 
(-9.48) 
-0.6177a 
(-7.33) 
-0.4425a 
(-8.99) 
-0.3571a 
(-10.46) 
GDPt -0.0583
b 
(-2.09) 
-0.2285a 
(-10.43) 
-0.1316a 
(-4.66) 
-0.1613a 
(-7.74) 
GDPt-1 -0.0610
b 
(-2.19) 
-0.0366 
(-1.20) 
-0.0293 
(-0.75) 
-0.0297 
(-1.10) 
DFAMt 0.0109
a 
(2.86) 
0.0093b 
(2.09) 
0.0235b 
(2.18) 
0.0108c 
(1.82) 
DEMPt -0.0025
 
(-0.81) 
0.0006 
(0.44) 
-0.0053a 
(-2.90) 
0.0016 
(1.28) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0.9857
b 
(2.34) 
1.1974b 
(2.53) 
0.8375c 
(1.77) 
1.6597b 
(2.32) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 0.3235
 
(0.84) 
-0.0028 
(-0.01) 
0.2999 
(0.75) 
0.4773 
(0.64) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 0.0868 
(0.18) 
-0.3137 
(-0.71) 
-0.2414 
(-0.49) 
1.2307b 
(1.99) 
INEFit 0.0055
c 
(1.91) 
-0.0011 
(-0.46) 
-0.0034c 
(-1.86) 
0.0106a 
(3.05) 
SIZEit -0.9575
 
(-0.42) 
-2.2527b 
(-2.11) 
-6.9324c 
(-1.87) 
1.1485 
(0.86) 
NIMit-2 0.0009
 
(0.64) 
0.0700b 
(2.23) 
0.0031c 
(1.72) 
0.0692 
(0.91) 
NIMit-3 0.0012
 
(0.60) 
0.0647a 
(3.05) 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
-0.0293 
(-0.44) 
EQUITYit-2 2.8718
b 
(2.31) 
-1.1718 
(-0.93) 
-0.8191 
(-0.76) 
-0.1088 
(-0.90) 
EQUITYit-3 -0.4308
 
(-0.29) 
-3.8491b 
(-2.52) 
2.2014c 
(1.89) 
0.9004 
(0.65) 
PREMit-3 0.0064
a 
(2.77) 
0.0045b 
(2.09) 
0.0019 
(0.80) 
0.0608b 
(2.23) 
RMSHAREit -3.9286
a 
(-3.02) 
2.2963b 
(2.05) 
-7.1398a 
(-3.17) 
0.7762 
(0.48) 
RMSHAREit * RPPRICEt-1 0.0239
c 
(1.71) 
-0.0259a 
(-3.47) 
-0.1232b 
(-2.06) 
-0.0285a 
(-3.79) 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.176 0.137 0.370 0.168 
AR (1) and p-value   -4.6a  (0.00)  -2.5a   (0.00)  -2.7a  (0.00)  -3.0a (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0.3   (0.72)   0.2    (0.79)   0.3   (0.71)  -0.2   (0.80) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
Panel A: Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Net Interest Margin (NIM)   
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable NIM is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the 
real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the 
banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market 
(the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices 
(or region, in the case of regression III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In 
the case of regressions IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing 
in the country (or region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing 
market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV V 
NIMit-1 5.921a   (42.69) 5.935a   (40.05) 5.924a  (42.69) 5.918a  (41.53) 5.918a  (41.45) 
GDPt 0.080c    (1.75) 0.066a    (2.71) 0.079c   (1.73) 0.084c   (1.84) 0.085c   (1.84) 
GDPt-1 -0.014   (-0.28) -0.017   (-0.26) -0.015   (-0.28) -0.008   (-0.15) -0.007   (-0.14) 
BBMBt 0.105c    (1.97) 0.122c    (1.81) 0.107c    (1.98) 0.150c   (1.83) 0.147c   (1.90) 
RISKit-2 0.495a   (15.93) 0.499a   (16.67) 0.494a  (16.11) 0.491a  (15.66) 0.491a  (15.65) 
RISKit-3 0.832a   (19.52) 0.839a   (20.88) 0.833a  (19.68) 0.829a  (19.08) 0.829a  (19.06) 
LIQit-1 0.013a     (3.20) 0.014b     (2.55) 0.013a  (3.00) 0.013a   (3.18) 0.013a  (3.17) 
LIQit-2 0.011a     (2.61) 0.011a     (2.65) 0.012a   (2.71) 0.012a  (2.98) 0.012a  (2.97) 
SDR3M it-1 0.185c        (1.72) 0.190b        (2.01) 0.108c     (1.73) 0.103c    (1.69) 0.103c     (1.70) 
SDR3M it-2 0.181c     (1.92) 0.156c     (1.65) 0.212b   (2.20) 0.209b  (2.19) 0.208b   (2.19) 
HHt -0.001    (-1.14) -0.001    (-1.32) -0.001   (-1.28) -0.001  (-1.22) -0.001  (-1.21) 
INEFit -0.005b   (-2.12) -0.005b  (-2.22) -0.005b (-2.10) -0.005b (-2.07) -0.005b (-2.07) 
ΔLOAN it -0.011a   (-5.11) -0.010a   (-5.48) -0.011a (-5.23) -0.011a (-5.00) -0.011a (-4.99) 
EQUITYit-2 7.138b    (2.15) 7.810b     (2.27) 7.164b  (2.16) 7.019b  (-2.12) 6.993b  (2.12) 
EQUITYit-3 1.922    (0.63) 1.772    (0.56) 1.938  (0.64) 1.780  (0.58) 1.796  (0.59) 
IPPit 2.544c    (1.77) 2.062c    (1.84) 2.473   (1.05) 2.648   (1.09) 2.650  (1.09) 
RMSHAREit 0.696    (0.66) 0.842    (0.78) 1.005  (0.93) 0.961   (0.89) 0.976 (0.91) 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0.023b (-2.32) -0.029b  (-2.42) -0.017b (-2.27) -0.016b (-2.22) 
Time Period  2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations       3555 3555 3555 3555 3555 
Sargan Test (p-value)       0.179 0.169 0.130 0.126 0.158 
AR (1) and p-value   -4.7a      (0.00)  -3.9a     (0.00)  -3.3a      (0.00)  -3.4a     (0.00)  -3.9a      (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0.5       (0.29)   -0.3    (0.73)   -0.5    (0.22)   0.2     (0.66)  -0.2      (0.60) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
Panel B: Linear Regressions and Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Return on Assets (ROA) 
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable ROA is the 
return on assets and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking sector and the value 0 
for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland, 
Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit 
risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to 
short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the 
ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; ΔLOAN is the loans 
growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-
interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; 
RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices (or region, in the case 
of regression III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In the case of regressions 
IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing in the country (or 
region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). t statistics 
are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables         I        II        III        IV        V 
ROAit-1 0.678b   (2.07) 0.678b   (2.07) 0.678b   (2.06) 0.676b   (2.06) 0.676b   (2.06) 
GDPt 0.045c    (1.66) 0.047c    (1.67) 0.045c    (1.66) 0.043c    (1.70) 0.042c    (1.70) 
GDPt-1 0.011     (0.26) 0.014     (0.34) 0.011     (0.27) 0.007     (0.18) 0.007     (0.17) 
BBMBt 0.072b    (2.50) 0.076b    (2.56) 0.071b    (2.45) 0.066b    (2.13) 0.065b    (2.13) 
RISKit-2 1.888a    (2.83) 1.886a    (2.83) 1.886a    (2.82) 1.884a    (2.82) 1.884a    (2.82) 
RISKit-3 1.137    (1.47) 1.136    (1.47) 1.137    (1.46) 1.135    (1.46) 1.134    (1.46) 
LIQit-1 0.032a   (2.99) 0.035a   (2.90) 0.030a   (2.89) 0.033a   (2.75) 0.033a   (2.75) 
LIQit-2 0.054b   (2.13) 0.070b   (2.20) 0.056b   (2.20) 0.052b   (2.09) 0.052b   (2.08) 
SDR3M it-1 0.061c      (1.67) 0.056      (1.52) 0.064c      (1.68) 0.062c      (1.68) 0.062c      (1.69) 
SDR3M it-2 0.194a   (3.51) 0.181a   (3.11) 0.198a   (3.56) 0.195a   (3.53) 0.195a   (3.53) 
HHt -0.002   (-0.57) -0.002   (-0.46) -0.002   (-0.61) -0.002   (-0.46) -0.002   (-0.46) 
INEFit -0.016a   (-2.79) -0.016a   (-2.79) -0.016a   (-2.79) -0.016a   (-2.79) -0.016a   (-2.79) 
ΔLOAN it -0.006   (-1.06) -0.006   (-1.06) -0.006   (-1.07) -0.006   (-1.10) -0.006   (-1.10) 
EQUITYit-2 4.012c    (1.82) 3.988c    (1.71) 4.007c    (1.73) 4.031c    (1.69) 4.035c    (1.69) 
EQUITYit-3 -0.695    (-0.26) -0.693    (-0.26) -0.708    (-0.27) -0.649    (-0.25) -0.645    (-0.25) 
IPPit 1.093a    (9.06) 1.094a    (9.04) 1.093a    (9.06) 1.093a    (9.08) 1.092a    (9.09) 
RMSHAREit -1.548    (-1.56) -1.495    (-1.51) -1.502    (-1.51) -1.619    (-1.59) -1.630    (-1.60) 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0.009c   (-1.89) -0.006c   (-1.87) -0.005c   (-1.77) -0.005c   (-1.86) 
Time Period  2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations       3555 3555 3555 3555 3555 
Sargan Test (p-value)       0.155 0.190 0.142 0.133 0.166 
AR (1) and p-value   -4.1a      (0.00)  -3.5a     (0.00)  -3.2a      (0.00)  -3.6a     (0.00)  -3.7a      (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0.5       (0.22)   -0.3    (0.70)   -0.5    (0.20)   0.3     (0.74)  -0.3      (0.72) 
Bank Fixed Effects          Yes          Yes           Yes         Yes          Yes 
Time Fixed Effects          Yes          Yes           Yes         Yes          Yes 
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Table 11: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis: Quadratic Specification 
This table reports the estimation results of 4 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (6). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable NIM is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the 
real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the 
banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market 
(the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; LTV is the average loan to value ratio, by country. Regressions XI and XII include all the banks 
for the period 2002 to 2008. Regressions XIII and XIV are estimated for the total sample without investment banks 
and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II III IV 
NIMit-1 5.525a     (19.44) 5.514a     (22.32) 0.514a     (6.90) 0.817a     (9.60) 
GDPt 0.069c      (1.68) 0.078c     (1.85) 0.021b      (2.37) 0.069c     (1.87) 
GDPt-1 -0.062     (-1.20) 0.026      (0.53) -0.005     (-1.07) 0.007      (1.06) 
BBMBt 0.157b      (2.52) 0.156b      (2.52) 0.066a      (9.13) 0.133a     (4.42) 
RISKit-2 4.214c     (1.70) 10.168c    (1.99) 2.308     (1.48) 6.944c    (1.78) 
RISKit-3 -7.164     (-1.22) -5.189     (-0.98) 1.329a     (2.59) -1.057     (-1.10) 
LIQit-1 0.183a      (3.41) 0.161a      (3.30) 0.036a      (2.92) 0.025a      (2.72) 
LIQit-2     0.071      (1.45) 0.056      (1.01)     0.000      (0.37) 0.000      (0.74) 
SDR3M it-1  0.125c        (1.86) 0.118c          (1.79)  0.012c        (1.69) 0.022c          (1.84) 
SDR3M it-2 0.192b     (2.10) 0.204b      (2.22) 0.071a     (4.24) 0.085b      (2.18) 
HHt  -0.096c    (1.79) -0.125b     (-2.43)  -0.042a    (-3.12) 0.000       (1.08) 
INEFit -0.007a   (-2.85) -0.008a     (-3.12) -0.017a   (-8.84) -0.004b     (-2.27) 
ΔLOAN it -0.030b   (-2.15) -0.035a     (-2.91) -0.038b   (-2.12) -0.008a     (-5.83) 
EQUITYit-2 6.222b   (2.12) 7.619b      (2.50) -1.148    (-1.43) 7.619b      (2.50) 
EQUITYit-3 0.959      (0.24) 1.607      (0.43) 2.528a     (2.60) 3.408b      (1.99) 
IPPit 9.667b    (2.01) 10.790b    (2.57) 4.144a    (5.25) 8.854b      (2.04) 
RMSHAREit 3.084c      (1.85) 3.879b      (2.26) 1.669a      (2.85) -0.088      (-0.96) 
RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 -182.122a    (-2.74) -213.578a    (-2.93) -0.150        (-0.02) -14.837      (-0.73) 
RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)2 1582.752c   (1.89) 1982.967b    (2.56) 111.77      (1.01) 174.467b    (2.26) 
LTVt  0.531a       (5.60)  0.199a       (2.71) 
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2006 2002-2006 
# Observations 3554 3554 2335 2335 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.166 0.171 0.175 0.157 
AR (1) and p-value   -4.2a          (0.00)  -3.9a         (0.00)   -4.8a          (0.00)  -3.6a         (0.00) 
AR (2) and p-value     0.4           (0.48)   -0.4         (0.51)     0.2           (0.88)   -0.6         (0.26) 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
